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In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the President has called upon all 
Governors to create a new government organization in each state1, a State Homeland 
Security Task Force (HSTF). The national strategies have also re-ordered the priority of 
the nation from a focus on the response and recovery to acts of terrorism to one of 
prevention and deterrence of new attacks. This redirection combined with the need for 
broader stakeholder participation, (e.g. industry, media, international border interests, and 
citizens themselves), dictates that states must evaluate and potentially adjust their 
approaches as well. A significant challenge is that, as in all other government programs, 
the expectations of all the stakeholders far outweigh any reasonable availability of 
resources. Additionally, there is no clear information or examination concerning what 
metrics or characteristics would determine a successful HSTF from one that is not. 
Even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the State of Washington has 
been recognized as dealing effectively and progressively with Homeland Security issues. 
However, there are always opportunities for improvement, refinement and reflection 
based upon analytical research and sound recommendations. The ultimate goal of this 
thesis is to provide information that will improve Washington State’s approach to 
Homeland Security and the protection of its citizens. 
This thesis gathers and analyzes federal mandates and expectations, state official 
opinions, and existing approaches for state Homeland Security infrastructures. From this 
analysis, it offers a model charter for a state HSTF, recommended outcomes and outputs 
for a state infrastructure to pursue achievement of the national objectives, and then tests 
these proposals against the State of Washington’s current Homeland Security 
infrastructure in a case study. The project provides specific recommendations that would 
enhance the already sophisticated approach executed by the leaders, partners and 
stakeholders of the Evergreen State. 
 
                                                 



























                                                
INTRODUCTION 
A. DISCUSSION 
State governments have been recognized as the primary fusion point for a 
significant portion of policy, operational, and implementation activities for homeland 
security. Additionally, the most critical decisions for resource allocation and effort 
prioritization have been delegated to state governments for all efforts within their 
jurisdictional boundaries. The federal government has required this role of states and has 
asked them to organize task forces to deal with these challenges but has provided little 
guidance on how states might establish, administer, and ensure effectiveness of these 
structures. States have begun to establish decision-making bodies independently, 
inconsistently, and with few measurements to evaluate effectiveness2. 
This first chapter will discuss the background of the challenges of establishing 
state HSTFs and the issues surrounding the mandates, both explicit and implicit, of the 
federal government as well as the considerations of individual state prerogatives and 
desires. The chapter will also summarize the findings and provide recommendations for a 
model charter that includes a proposed mission, scope, objectives, outcomes and outputs 
for state Homeland Security infrastructures. 
Even before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the State of Washington has 
been recognized as dealing effectively and progressively with Homeland Security issues. 
But there are always opportunities for improvement, refinement and reflection based 
upon analytical research and sound recommendations. The ultimate goal of this paper is 
to provide information that will improve the State of Washington’s approach to 
Homeland Security and the protection of its citizens. 
The demand for each state to have some form of coordinating body for homeland 
security issues may be the panacea to our collective struggles with this new threat, or it 
may just be an un-resourced, administration-specific initiative that will lack longevity and 
state enthusiasm. The requirements for state and local governments to participate in a 
national security emergency, to an extent not seen since the mid-decades of the 20th 
 
2 These assertions are fully developed, discussed and supported throughout the content of this thesis. 
1 
century, has prompted a heated and passionate debate about responsibility and funding3. 
That debate is destined to continue through the early years of the new millennia. The 
greatest dangers and most imminent threats to the domestic population seem to be well 
defined at the strategic policy level. However, the issues surrounding the division and 
assignment of new tasks amongst all the partners at the federal, state, local, tribal and 
private levels is always hotly debated in any homeland security policy, or operational, 
discussion. After a decade that included several devastating terrorist attacks within the 
continental United States as well as hundreds of domestically initiated events, the 
requirements for roles outside the federal family cannot be denied. But what are these 
roles and what specifically does the federal government expect of state governments? 
How should states be approaching this challenge, regardless of federal direction? 
This project will investigate and analyze the requirements, both implied and 
explicit, of state Homeland Security infrastructures; examine how a sample of states have 
already organized to address these requirements; provide recommendations to both 
improve current state structures and to provide a template of desirable characteristics for 
all state governments as they organize to confront this challenge. The conclusions will be 
tested against the current homeland security infrastructure of Washington State in a case 
study and will provide specific recommendations for improvements. 
In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the President has called upon all 
Governors to create a new government organization in each state4. The request to create 
State Homeland Security Task Forces has been done with little consideration of required 
resources, specific guidance, expectations, or definition. Additionally, there is no clear 
information or investigation concerning what characteristics would determine a 
successful HSTF from one that is not. 
More specifically, the National Strategy for Homeland Security calls upon state 
governments to manage the interface and inter-jurisdictional relationships of all the 
agencies, as well as the private sector, which have a role in homeland security.  While 
                                                 
3 The debate concerning the distribution of responsibilities and funding methodologies, especially 
between state and city governments, is well documented in newspaper articles, weekly periodicals, and 
congressional testimonies.  
4 Ibid., National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
2 
nearly every state government had established some form of homeland security 
coordinating body, or at least a basic anti-terrorism program, both before and after the 
attacks of 2001, there was little consistency in the intent, chartering, and membership of 
these organizations5. Additionally, these organizations could not have predicted the 
advent of the Department of Homeland Security, Northern Command, and all the other 
directions and intents stemming from administration, congressional, and independent 
government actions at the federal, state, and local levels. 
The national strategies have also appropriately re-ordered the priority of the 
nation from a focus on the response and recovery to acts of terrorism to one of prevention 
and deterrence of new attacks. This redirection combined with the need for broader 
stakeholder participation (e.g. industry, media, international border interests, and citizens 
themselves), dictates that states must evaluate, and where necessary, adjust their 
approaches as well. A significant challenge is that, as in all other government programs, 
the expectations of all the stakeholders far outweigh any reasonable availability of 
resources. A deeper, objective analysis of the requirements is a necessary first step before 
the implementation of systems and the commitment of resources based only upon 
emotional, subjective reactions to the escalating national crisis of terrorism. 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The multi-governmental battlefield for terrorism is broader and more complex 
than any other issue that has faced this nation since the civil war. The involvement and 
commitment of states, local jurisdictions and the private sector is critical to the success in 
this battle, and the leadership of state governments is not only required explicitly and 
implicitly, it is the only level in which the broadest interaction and facilitation of all 
partners can be effected. Therefore, the organizational infrastructure in which states 
deliberate, prioritize and execute policies and procedures to combat terrorism is essential 
to the nation’s success. 
                                                 
5 This assertion is based upon the author’s personal experience and involvement with the National 
Emergency Management Association whose members are the directors of emergency management for the 
nation’s state and territorial governments. Federal funding prior to September 11, 2001 focused upon state 
distribution of funds for planning while additional programs for large urban areas were also in place. These 
programs combined with a general recognition of terrorism as one hazard a state must acknowledge in their 
comprehensive planning efforts required, both implicitly and explicitly, that, as a minimum, some type of 
programmatic organization must be in place. 
3 
Based upon an analysis of federal documents, state practices, a case study, as well 
as interviews with officials at all levels of government, the proposal is that the following 
charter be a model and an evaluation tool from which states might accomplish the goals 
of state homeland security through a state Homeland Security Task Force. 
1. Mission 
To improve statewide terrorism prevention, preparedness, response and recovery 
readiness by providing a single statewide policy coordination group for all homeland 
security issues, initiatives, and strategies. To provide program oversight of homeland 
security roles among and between federal, state, local, tribal, private and volunteer 
entities. 
2. Scope 
The Task Force will provide homeland security policy recommendations to the 
Governor and/or his/her appointed homeland security advisor. The Task Force will 
address and consider the full spectrum of homeland security activities to include: 1) the 
prevention of future attacks, 2) the protection of critical assets and infrastructure, 3) the 
preparedness of all emergency disciplines, businesses, and the general public, 4) response 
and recovery capabilities, and 5) all legal and legislative issues that enhance the state’s 
security.  Additionally, the Task Force must include policy input or executive 
representation of all levels of government, all prevention and response disciplines, the 
private sector for their preparedness, response and recovery, the private sector for critical 
infrastructure protection, statewide and/or regional anti-terrorism workgroups, legal 
advisors and volunteer agencies. The Task Force may appoint, or include existing, sub-
committees or workgroups to ensure inclusion of these representatives and to accomplish 
specific tactical or programmatic activities. The size of the Task Force itself must balance 
between the needs for broad-based participation and organizational effectiveness. 
3. Objectives 
While these may evolve as the fiscal, executive and tactical environment 
fluctuates, certain baseline objectives must be met: 1) facilitate activities, policies and 
programs that will prevent terrorist attacks, 2) develop and implement, (or oversee 
implementation of,) a comprehensive statewide homeland security strategy that will 
guide and prioritize policy actions, resource decisions, and operational guidance for all 
4 
entities for the full spectrum of homeland security activities, from prevention through 
prosecution, 3) provide effective collaboration, communications and coordination 
between all entities as well as the general public, 4) effectively, expediently and 
efficiently allocate, and advocate for, sufficient resources in accordance with the 
statewide strategy, 5) ensure accountability of all homeland security strategic actions and 
monitor the effectiveness of all programmatic activities, and 6) monitor and coordinate 
with homeland security efforts of regional, national, international and federal entities. 
4. Outcomes and Outputs 
By utilizing the three national Homeland Security priority objectives, numerous 
outcomes and outputs can be defined for achievement and measurement by state HSTFs. 
For example, to achieve the prevention of terrorist attacks objectives, outcomes for a state 
HSTF could be described as the: 1) increased ability to identify indications of an existing 
or future threat, 2) increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats as they are 
identified, 3) reduced vulnerability of critical infrastructures and other potential targets, 
and 4) increased appropriateness of protection and/or other threat response activities. 
Additionally, outputs could be established that promote the successful (or progress 
towards) achievement of each outcome. For example, outputs for the first outcome above 
could be the: 1) development of a strategy and commensurate business plans that describe 
how collaboration amongst all entities that participate in threat identification processes 
can be assured, 2) creation and implementation of a system to collect, screen and store 
relevant information with investigative value, and 3) development of a training system 
that provides adequate basic level threat awareness education to all public service 
entities, the private sector, and the general public as appropriate. In total, this paper 
recommends eleven outcomes for the achievement of the three national priorities and 
thirteen outputs to forward progress for successful attainment of the prevention outcomes 
for state HSTFs. 
As these suggested charter, outcome, and output characteristics for a state HSTF 
are vetted and adjusted per state desires and based upon the requirements, expectations, 
and needs from all customers and stakeholders; several subsequent activities can follow: 
1) currently established approaches can be measured for their effectiveness in terms of 
these characteristics, 2) advice can be provided to executive officials for either change or 
5 
establishment of such structures, and 3) cost-benefit decisions for the investment in such 
organizations can attempt to be made more in an environment of objective, strategic 
intentions versus one of only near-term expediency based upon emotional, political 
reactions to the threat. 
This thesis used a case study of the State of Washington to evaluate its 
infrastructure approach against the above model charter’s characteristics and the 
proposed outcomes and outputs. While the state has already achieved a high level of 
Homeland Security performance, there were several recommendations offered as a result 
of this assessment to strengthen its approach even further: 1) assign a Lead State Agency, 
2) seek a specific legislative mandate and appropriation, 3) continue their “system of 
systems” approach6, but strengthen direction and control delineations, 4) enhance the 
focus of the infrastructure, and 5) redirect or enhance Governor’s Domestic Security 
Executive Group7 towards more strategic engagement. 
C. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
The first chapter of this thesis will discuss the background of the challenges of 
establishing state HSTFs and the issues surrounding the mandates, both explicit and 
implicit, of the federal government and the considerations of individual state prerogatives 
and desires. The chapter will also summarize the findings and provide recommendations 
for a model charter that includes a proposed mission, scope, objectives, outcomes and 
outputs for state Homeland Security infrastructures.   
In the second chapter, an content analysis of federal requirements and 
expectations will de conducted. This will include analysis of federal documents, 
strategies, and directives as well as opinions from federal Homeland Security officials. 
The chapter will propose themes, composition, tasks, and potential outcomes as 
                                                 
6 Beginning in December of 2003, the State of Washington’s Homeland Security Advisor and his 
senior staff began to describe the intersection and coordination of multiple groups and committees 
addressing Homeland Security issues under his direction as operating in a “system of systems” structure as 
opposed to a hierarchical organizational method.  
7 This group was established in the weeks immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks. It is 
chaired by the Adjutant General who is the Governor’s assigned Homeland Security Advisor, Other 
members comprising this group include the Governor’s Chief of Staff, his Communications Director, senior 
policy and budget advisors, the Director of the Emergency Management Division, the Secretaries of Health 
and Transportation agencies, and the Directors of Ecology, Information Services, Agriculture, State Patrol, 
and the Office of Financial Management. This group has met, and continues to meet, nearly weekly since 
the September 11th attacks to coordinate and provide policy guidance.  
6 
expressed by federal documents and individuals and discuss the potential implications 
and challenges of Presidential Directives. The chapter will refine these federal 
expectations with input from state leaders and an analysis of current state approaches. 
Finally, this chapter will propose a Model Charter that a state might use, or use for 
guidance to adapt their existing model to for their individual state’s particular needs and 
operating environment. 
Chapter III will provide recommendations for effective outcomes and outputs of a 
state Homeland Security infrastructure. By using the three national Homeland Security 
priority objectives, this chapter will describe outcomes for each of these national 
objectives and outputs for the prevention of terrorist attacks outcomes. The focus of these 
outcomes and outputs will be on what the state’s HSTF, or otherwise named 
infrastructure, might be able to use to guide efforts and organizational construct.  
Chapter IV will utilize the conclusions, tools and recommendations from the 
previous chapters and apply them against the author’s home jurisdiction, the State of 
Washington. From this analysis, an evaluation or assessment of Washington State’s 
current organizational infrastructure will be made and recommendations offered. The 
state’s current structure will be briefly described and then compared to the elements of 
the Model Charter and the outcomes and outputs established in Chapter III. 
Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be presented in the last chapter. 
This effort will provide information and recommendations for all states and territories in 
the nation as well as the federal government as it continues to strive for a collaborative, 
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II. REQUIREMENTS AND EXPECTATIONS 
A. FEDERAL EXPECTATIONS 
It is the expressed policy and intent of Congress, however, that the 
responsibility for civil defense should be vested primarily in the States and 
their political subdivisions. 
President Harry S. Truman, January 
12, 1951; statement upon signing the 
Federal Civil Defense Act of 19508 
State and local levels of governments have primary responsibility for 
funding, preparing, and operating the emergency services that would 
respond in the event of a terrorist attack. 
National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, July 2002 
1. Introduction 
Before being able to discuss the call for a Homeland Security Task Force in every 
state and territory, the overall federal expectations of state actions in this new 
environment should be acknowledged. Once this is accomplished, state opinions and 
current state constructs could be introduced to offer model or suggested mission, scope 
and objective language for a state Homeland Security infrastructure. This chapter will 
show that the federal expectations combined with state level opinion, desires and current 
practices can produce a model charter for state infrastructures that can be further refined 
based upon individual state needs and environments. 
2. Specific Language and Suggestions 
The specific language of the call for state HSTFs, supported by interviews of 
senior federal officials, help narrow and clarify the federal government’s desired 
characteristics for these task forces. The National Strategy for Homeland Security states 
that: 
Because of our federalist traditions and our large number of local 
governments, the federal government must look to state governments to 
facilitate close coordination and cooperation among all levels of 
                                                 
8 John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Federal Civil 
Defense Act of 1950; January 12, 1951. Source The American Presidency Project, Accessed at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/site/docs/pppus.php?admin=033&year=1951&id=10, accessed March 23, 
2004. 
9 
government—federal, state, and local. Therefore, the president calls on 
each governor to establish a single Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF) 
for the state, to serve as his or her primary coordinating body with the 
federal government. This would realign the existing Anti-Terrorism Task 
Forces, established after September 11th in 93 federal judicial districts 
nationwide, to serve as the law enforcement component of the broader 
HSTFs. The HSTFs would provide a collaborative, cost-effective structure 
for effectively communicating to all organizations and citizens. They 
would help streamline and coordinate all federal, regional, and local 
programs. They would also fit neatly into the regional emergency response 
network that the Department of Homeland Security would inherit from 
FEMA.9 
It is possible to summarize the key characteristics of the HSTFs as: they are 
encouraged to 1) coordinate all government levels, 2) coordinate all program activities, 3) 
establish a single coordinating body between the state and federal government, 4) utilize 
the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces as the law enforcement component of the HSTF, 5) build 
regional capacities and 6) communicate to organizations and citizens. 
The Strategy does not specify or even allude to what the composition of these task 
forces might be, what level of authority should be granted to them, what level of official 
should chair it, whether they should be strategic or tactical bodies, how they might be 
administratively and legally established, or how existing agencies assigned Homeland 
Security responsibilities might be engaged or affected. Several senior Federal homeland 
security officials stated during interviews10 that the federal government did not want to 
be prescriptive in these areas. They said that the Governors should have the flexibility to 
design these entities as they deem necessary, based upon political, geographical, cultural, 
statutory, operational, and any other number of critical state factors.  These officials also 
encouraged states not to wait for more federal guidance for the establishment of the 
HSTFs, that it is more than likely, primarily due to the desire not to be prescriptive, that 
individual state’s initiatives will be the first models and templates available for advice.  
While officials stressed that there is no mandate for specific characteristics or 
metrics for success, they could offer their opinions on what themes might make an 
effective state HSTF: 
                                                 
9 U.S. Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, 14. 
10 These interviews were conducted during the time period January 30, 2003 – February 12, 2003. The 
respondents asked to remain anonymous. 
10 
• Multi-discipline (e.g. representatives from fire, law enforcement, military, 
public health, emergency management, environmental, etc.) 
• Multi-jurisdictional (e.g. federal, state, local and tribal levels of 
government participation.) 
• Private sector and/or critical infrastructure owner-operator involvement. 
• No national “one size fits all” mentality. 
• Representation from existing regional homeland security specific, or 
related, efforts. 
• Representation from Information Sharing and Analysis Centers’ (ISAC) 
sectors.  
• While not necessarily the central state Homeland Security authority, the 
HSTF would be the central body for all coordination. 
• Would provide accountability and monitoring activities for all Homeland 
Security efforts. 
Another senior Federal homeland security official confirmed these themes, and 
suggested that the HSTFs would provide the fusion point between policy and operations. 
He also offered his views regarding how possibly to measure a successful HSTF:  
• Prevention of terrorist attacks. 
• Production of a collaborative resource allocation strategy. 
• Effective and expedient allocation and expenditure of funds in accordance 
with the strategy. 
The official also offered specific successful metrics, primarily the “expediency of 
money to purpose” and a reference to the state’s role in prevention that is generally 
absent from all other strategies and guidelines. 
3. National Strategies 
While the National Security Strategy of September 2002 makes a brief note of the 
role of all levels of government in the homeland security arena11, it is clearly the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security that specifies the actions desired of states. In addition to 
the call for a State Homeland Security Task Force, the Strategy looks to state and local 
governments for a variety of initiatives and involvement from specific legal and  
                                                 
6 National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, 6. 
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administrative actions, such as state drivers’ licensing standards, to general cooperative 
measures such as collaboration and partnership with the private sector. An extraction of 
the various suggestions for state and local government follows12: 
• Establish a Homeland Security Task Force. 
• Develop a state strategy complementary to the National Strategy utilizing 
critical mission areas. 
• Implement the Homeland Security Advisory System. 
• Identify and prioritize critical infrastructure requiring protection or 
defense. 
• Maximize grant opportunities. 
• Develop mutual aid implementation strategies. 
• Develop plans and deploy an Incident Management System. 
• Develop and deploy a statewide interoperability emergency 
communications plan. 
• Develop a plan for receipt and distribution of medicines from national 
pharmaceutical stockpiles. 
• Develop, plan, and exercise for annual Weapons of Mass Destruction 
preparedness certification. 
• Develop first responder training and evaluation standards. 
• Review and develop state law changes. 
• Make interoperable acquisition decisions. 
• Develop strategies and plan to host pilot programs and demonstrations. 
• Develop and deploy a secure state intranet for Homeland Security. 
• Develop deployment plan for tactical wireless infrastructure for first 
responders. 
All of these activities could be considered for inclusion in a state’s Homeland 
Security program with the potential assignment of the HSTF as one entity to participate 
in their prioritization, implementation and management. However, except for a few short 
references, national strategies fail to clarify state and local roles in the nation’s first 
priority for Homeland Security: to prevent attacks from occurring in the first place. The 
levels of detail for non-federal roles in response and recovery from attacks are exhaustive 
s for protection are emphasized, but there is no similar and even the state/local role
                                                 
12 Extraction conducted by Joseph Huden, Special Assistant to The Adjutant General, Washington 
State Military Department, September 2002. 
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analysis and strategy for their participation in the interdiction of this enemy within 
domestic jurisdictions. Even the recently released National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism makes only passing references to the needed efforts of state and local 
governments which requires “a coordinated and focused effort from our entire society – 
the federal, state, and local governments, the private sector, and the American people.”13 
Strategic guidance and direction for other than federal and international roles in the 
prevention goal continue to be vague. 
4. Design of a State Homeland Security Task Force – Federal 
Components 
By analyzing the federal homeland security expectations and outcomes for states 
based upon legislative, strategic and implementation documents, the tasks and priorities 
of state HSTFs might begin to be established. Table 1 represents the beginning of a 
measurement matrix for building and grading state HSTFs. As desired characteristics 
from other stakeholders are gathered, the matrix can be further refined into an effective 
guideline and measurement tool. Table 1 organizes the essential elements of federal 
expectations into four categories; themes, composition, tasks, and potential desired 
outcomes. 
a. Themes 
Provide for the coordination of government entities both vertically and 
horizontally, conduct and ensure policy coordination, conduct and ensure program 
coordination, provide a central point of contact, include a law enforcement interface, 
account for and consider regional effects and interactions, and provide for private sector 
involvement. 
b. Composition 
A state HSTF should include state agencies with multi-disciplinary 
representation.  These include, for example, public health, safety, emergency response, 
legal, law enforcement, etc.; federal agencies – also multi-disciplinary; local and tribal 
government representatives, state and local executive as well as discipline representation 
(also includes large metropolitan representation); Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (in its 
entirety or liaison); Joint Terrorism Task Force liaison; interstate regional partners;  
                                                 
13 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, 25. 
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private industry leaders who represent the economic infrastructure; private industry 
leaders who represent and/or own critical infrastructure; and the state homeland security 
leader. 
c. Tasks 
It should develop and implement the state’s Homeland Security strategy; 
implement the Homeland Security Advisory System; identify and prioritize critical 
infrastructure; develop mutual aid, interoperability, communications and incident 
management strategies; develop legal strategies; oversee planning, training, exercising 
and equipping strategies and standards; coordinate all internal and external Homeland 
Security programs (e.g. the Strategic National Stockpiles and BioWatch); and provide a 
central coordinating body. 
d. Potential Outcomes 
The state HSTF should strive for the prevention of terrorist attacks; the 
effective and expedient allocations of resources; a collaborative, cost effective 
organizational environment; an effective communications structure that reaches into all 
organizations and the general public; and effective accountability and monitoring of all 
statewide Homeland Security activities. These are “potential” outcomes based upon an 
analysis of federal expectations, Chapter III further analyzes this area and ultimately 
proposes the outcomes and outputs recommended by this thesis. 
 
Table 1. Federal Expectations of a State HSTF 





State Agencies – Multi-
disciplinary (e.g. public health, 
safety, emergency response, 
legal, law enforcement, etc) 
Develop and Implement State 
HS Strategy 




Federal Agencies - Multi-
disciplinary (e.g. public health, 
safety, emergency response, 
legal, law enforcement, etc) 
Implement the Homeland 
Security Advisory System 




Local and tribal governments, 
executive/discipline 








Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 
(in entirety or liaison) 
Develop mutual aid, 
interoperability, 
communications and incident 
management strategies 
Effective communications to 
all organizations and public 
Central Point of 
Contact 
Joint Terrorism Task Force 
Liaison 
Develop legal strategies Effective accountability and 
monitoring of all statewide 
HS activities 
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Regional Partners Develop resource strategies  
Regional Effects 
Private Industry – Economic 
Infrastructure 
Oversee planning, training, 





Private Industry – Critical 
Infrastructure 
Coordinate all internal and 
external HS programs (e.g. 
Strategic National Stockpiles) 
 




5. Homeland Security Presidential Directives 
Another critical component for the expectations of state and local governments 
can be derived from the language of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs). 
At the time of this writing, there are nine HSPDs which in the statement of HSPD-1 are 
intended to “record and communicate presidential decisions about the homeland security 
policies of the United States.”14 The impact of theses directives on the execution of state 
and local activities cannot be discounted or ignored. 
The purpose of HSPD-5, Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents15 is to 
establish a single system for the management of all domestic emergencies, whether they 
are terrorist, natural or accidental in nature. The directive recognizes the current response 
levels in which state and local assets and resources are applied first and then the federal 
government supplements their efforts, but the directive also places implicit mandates on 
state and local governments to adopt a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to 
be developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Explicitly, it states that by federal 
fiscal year 2005 “Federal departments and agencies shall make adoption of the NIMS a 
requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for providing Federal preparedness 
assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities.”16 Obviously, state HSTFs will  
                                                 
14 George W. Bush, 43rd President of the United States. Directive on Organization and Operation of 
the Homeland Security Council; Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 1. The White House. October 
29, 2001. 
15 George W. Bush, 43rd President of the United States. Directive on Management of Domestic 
Incidents; Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 5. The White House. February 28, 2003. 
16 Ibid., Section (20). 
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have to consider the implications of adopting NIMS as well as acknowledging that failure 
to do so essentially negate all fiscal assistance from the federal government for Homeland 
Security. 
HSPD-8, Directive on National Preparedness17 calls for the establishment of a 
national all-hazards preparedness goal. Once this goal is established, measurable 
readiness priorities will be developed that “appropriately balance the potential threat and 
magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources 
required preventing, responding to, and recovering from them. It will also include 
readiness metrics and elements that support the national preparedness goal…”18 As states 
organize, reorganize and/or establish state infrastructures to address Homeland Security 
issues, they will have to incorporate a mechanism for achieving and evaluating against 
these metrics as well. Unfortunately, the goal itself is not due to be submitted by the 
Secretary until it is submitted in the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Fiscal 
Year (FFY) 2006 budget. Therefore, metrics that would be valuable for current 
consideration at the state and local level are not available. This HSPD also states that a 
pre-requisite for receiving Federal preparedness assistance is conditional upon the 
“adoption of approved statewide strategies”19 by September 30, 2005. Assessment and 
evaluation methods will also be established and provided to the president in an annual 
report. An interesting dichotomy is that while the directive calls for consultation with 
state and local governments as it is executed, the last section states that “This directive is 
intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal 
Government, and it is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its 
departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.”20 
So how seriously should state and local government consider these Presidential  
                                                 
17 George W. Bush, 43rd President of the United States. Directive on National Preparedness; 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive - 8. The White House. December 17, 2003. 
18 Ibid., Section (6). 
19 Ibid., Section (9). 
20 Ibid., Section (27). 
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Directives? On the one hand, failure to comply at the state and local level could put their 
federal funding receipts in jeopardy, and yet it is clearly stated above that these directives 
only apply to federal executive agencies.  
The final implications of these HSPDs are yet to be determined as the deadline for 
development; implementation and definition of the details are still in the future. However, 
as states organize and institute their objectives, goals and priorities for statewide 
initiatives and their infrastructures, these future requirements must be acknowledged. 
Otherwise, both federal fund availability and some level of national consistency in 
approaches and programs could be lost. 
B. REFINING EXPECTATIONS 
[Success of an HSTF is measured] by the clarity of the vision, the depth of 
the collaborative partnerships, the wide range of support, the capability of 
[the] equipment, the quality of work generated from the subcommittees 
and the overall success of Homeland Security statewide. 
Scott Behunin, Director of 
Emergency Services and Homeland 
Security, State of Utah; March 2003 
 
1. Introduction  
Section A proposed significant work, activities and expectations of states in 
answer to the federal requirements. While interviews with federal officials give the 
impression that states are free to structure at their discretion, correspondence from the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to Governors clearly encourages Governors to follow a 
federal desire, for example, designating the states’ homeland security advisor for FFY 03 
grant administration.21 Nevertheless, even within this environment, states retain the 
freedom to design internal infrastructures, as they deem appropriate. The question at this 
point is how identify the most important aspects of a state HSTF. 
2. Other Stakeholder Input 
In interviews with and surveys of other-than-federal players22, the overall 
irements is consistent with the direction others feel is direction of the federal requ
                                                 
21 Ridge, Tom. Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Grant Award Letter to Governors 
Dated March 6, 2003. 
22 Surveys and interviews of seven state homeland security advisors and/or emergency management 
directors were conducted in February 2003. These seven directors were a sample of small, medium and 
large states from western, central, and eastern areas of the U.S. 
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necessary to accomplish both strategic and programmatic tasks. Of course, the opinions 
of individual state representatives were not the same in every aspect, but still certain 
themes evolved that strengthened, clarified or added to the opinions of the federal 
analysis. Additionally, many states have already established either a “Task Force” or 
“Security Council” that address many of the components of the federal characteristics. 
When the seven senior state officials23 who have responsibilities to direct the statewide 
components of emergency management and/or homeland security were interviewed, it 
was obvious that the concept of some type of coordination group was supported, if not 
already in place. Five thematic areas comprise the synthesis of these comments: 
a. Advisory 
The nature of this body should primarily be advisory to either the 
Homeland Security leader of the state or the Governor. While it may obviously have 
powerful positions in all aspects of homeland security issues, the HSTF by itself is not a 
final decision maker. The Governor or his/her single designee is the final authority. 
Several existing organizations have the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, or the 
Homeland Security Advisor as the chair of their existing task force or council. 
b. Strategic and Policy Nature 
The overall opinion was that this is not an operational or tactical entity. 
The HSTF exists to oversee strategic planning, comprehensive efforts, policy 
development, and set overall direction for homeland security within a state. It also will 
monitor the national and federal efforts as well as have some level of oversight of the 
operational groups that are developing tactical programs. 
c. Multi-Discipline, Multi-Jurisdictional 
While general agreement over this aspect exists, no specific theme of who, 
how many, or at what level of authority should the members be who comprise this force. 
Arguments both for widespread participation and narrow, state agency-only 
representation were made effectively, but even in the narrow arguments, it was stated that 
the HSTF must coordinate with the full spectrum of partners through other structures or 
methods. This appears to be the most flexible area for state-centric design based upon 
individual state dynamics. 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
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d. Prevention Aspects 
This aspect of homeland security was clearly sounded in state and local 
input. Although federal guidance for states in this area is vague, it is apparent that a state 
HSTF must include a component, interface or function related the prevention process. 
e. Strategic- and Programmatic-Based Metrics 
Plan development, strategic outcomes, exercise results, terrorism acts 
prevented, and quality and capability improvements were all metrics offered by this 
constituency. There was general consensus that measurements are important, but that 
they should certainly be strategic progress and enhancement grades, and not “widget 
counting.” 
There was no resistance at any level of input for the existence of a state 
Homeland Security Task Force or some other coordinating group(s) by another name. In 
fact, most state representatives voiced the opinion that they were already accomplishing 
what they viewed as necessary in their minds for the basic premise of the President’s call 
for a state HSTF. However, it is just as obvious that, for the most part, that the 
establishment of these organizations occurred well before the strategy’s publication 
and/or without the advantage of a clear vision that one might expect from that same 
strategy. 
In a discussion with a group of experts from military and emergency 
disciplines24, characteristics were also proposed that are necessary for the outcomes of a 
state HSTF: that it develops strategies and plans; coordinates all programs; possesses 
considerable authority, autonomy, accountability; and must coordinate all levels of 
activity. A National Emergency Management Association and Council of State 
Governments survey25 of all states in May of 2002 revealed that while every state had 
organized “somehow” to address the function of homeland security; the characteristics, 
purposes and authorities of each was very diverse and generally answered the call to 
organize but not necessarily to address a consistent national purpose or outcome. The 
                                                 
24 The discussion was conducted on January 10, 2003 and included representatives of local fire, state 
and local emergency management /homeland security, national guard, Coast Guard, Navy, state public 
safety agency, and state public health. 
25 State Organizational Structure for Homeland Security; A National Survey. National Emergency 
Management Association and the Council of State Governments. May 2002. 
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President’s call for establishing state HSTFs occurred two months after this survey was 
complete and obviously many more months, if not years, after many states had already 
established some form of homeland security organization. 
The National Governors Association also recommended that each state, by 
direction of their Governors, establish a homeland security structure and listed over 100 
specific tasks and checklist-type activities that Governor’s should address26. The 
guidance is very comprehensive as it includes everything from interoperable 
communications challenges to agro and cyber terrorism, but it does not describe what a 
state homeland security structure might look like or be asked to specifically accomplish, 
(other than, ideally, everything in the guide.) This guidance along with the federal 
expectations as stated in Section 1 can clearly be handed to a state HSTF as 
comprehensive data to analyze, prioritize, and address in either strategic or tactical 
planning efforts. 
3. Analysis of Existing State Approaches 
Every state has established a methodology for organizing for Homeland Security. 
While many states had established an approach prior to the attacks of September 11, 
2001, it is clear that every state has evolved to some extent in order to address the myriad 
of challenges, directives, and other issues of the new environment of the post-9/11 world. 
Just the requirement alone that each Governor should appoint a single point-of-contact, 
(the State Homeland Security Advisor and/or State Administrative Agent,) to interact 
with the federal government has spawned the creation of new positions, offices, and 
agency missions. Although the variety of individual state organizational methods is 
extensive, certain themes exist in their formation authorities, executive directives, 
compositions, and missions.27 
 
                                                 
26 Governors Guide to Emergency Management; Volume 2: Homeland Security. National Governors 
Association, Center for Best Practices. Copyright 2002. 
27 State Homeland Security Organizational Structures. National Governors Association, Center for 
Best Practices. December 2003. Available at 
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/HOMESECSTRUCTURES.PDF, accessed March 20, 2004. Additional 
information regarding each state’s current approach and structures was obtained via a review of each state’s 
homeland security information posted on their individual web sites, when available, from March 18-20, 
2004. An unrelated observation during this review revealed that information on Homeland Security efforts 
available on each state’s website varied substantially from little to no information to nearly complete 
posting of all activities in extensive detail and openness. 
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a. Formation Authorities 
The authority which each of the state’s formed their organizational 
structure or Homeland Security Official appointment varied across the nation. Some were 
simple memorandum appointments of the additional duty to an existing state official such 
as the state’s Adjutant General, emergency management agency director or public safety 
commissioner. A few structures were authorized solely by a state agency director under 
his/her own authority. However, most were formed under the authority and mandate of 
legislative rule or act, or under the authority of a Governor’s Executive Order. A 
significant issue in the differences of formation authority is the variety of the long-term 
existence ability of the organizational structures. Those created under legislative rule or 
act will traditionally survive longer with only incremental charter changes, while those 
created or authorized by Governors or executive agency officials may suffer substantial, 
frequent redirection or even termination as incumbents change office. On the other hand, 
if the legislative mandate was initially flawed, then these structures will have less 
flexibility to change and adjust than those under executive, individual directive. 
b. Executive Direction Language 
Regardless of the formation authority, all of these organizational 
appointments and/or structures were given some type of strategic direction or expectation 
when they were ordered to be created. Some were created to address an existing and 
specific need, such as to better enable the sharing of information and the creation of a 
strategy. Others were asked to only provide recommendations for other executive actions 
while more still were asked to provide the coordination point for all activities and entities 
involved, or required for, homeland security actions. Another divergence among the 
states is the level of tasks they were asked to perform. Some were directed to provide 
policy or strategic advice while others were asked to develop specific operational plans 
for the response to acts of terrorism. A prevalent task was the requirement to advise 
and/or decide on the distribution of funding and resources related to Homeland Security.  
c. Composition 
The greatest variety of divergence amongst states exists in this area and 
can further be analyzed in three distinct relationship definitions: lead agency designation; 
primary representation inclusion; and command, control and coordination interaction. 
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For the most part, the designation of the state’s Homeland Security 
Advisor is consistent with the designation of the required State Administrative Agent in 
each state. From this, the lead governmental agency is most often assigned to the agency 
under these designees’ authority. In many cases, an existing state military department, 
emergency management agency and/or public safety agency lead the efforts for homeland 
security activities consistent with their director’s designation as the Homeland Security 
Advisor. However, there are exceptions as some states established separate agencies or 
executive offices to address Homeland Security issues but the lead action agencies are 
not under their direct authority. Generally, the explicit, (and sometimes implicit,) 
designation of the lead state agency follows the designation of the grant administration 
authority but not always. Additionally, in a few cases of an already established 
authoritative policy-making council or task force, no clear lead state agency exists 
because the council makes the determination of task assignment among numerous 
agencies. 
The representation outside lead agencies in advice and/or policy-making 
groups is also varied across the nation. As a minimum, most states have established or 
built upon existing multi-agency coordination groups to conduct collaborative decision-
making. However, while some have only a few state agency directors represented on 
these councils, others have comparatively large or even multiple, groups of individuals 
who play a part in the advisory or decision-making processes for state Homeland 
Security. At various levels of these state organizational constructs, tactical first responder 
discipline representatives, elected officials at both the state and local level, agency 
directors, agency staff, business leaders, trade and discipline association representation, 
tribal members, utility providers, and even individual citizen appointments can be found. 
There is little correlation between the type of composition and the level of authority given 
to the varying structures. A large state Homeland Security infrastructure may be advisory 
or policy-making, while in another state, a smaller, limited representational group may 
have differing levels of authority all occurring at the same time depending on the 
magnitude of the issue to be addressed. 
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This leads to the third area of analysis regarding the composition of 
existing state structures. The lines of authority, coordination, and communication are as 
varied as the number of states in the union. Due to the two aforementioned elements, the 
myriad of combinations of interactions amongst all the players prevents a conclusion of 
any consistent theme. This statement begs the question of whether there should be a 
national consistency in this element, which further leads to the question of whether 
composition and the correlating lines of communication and authority should be a 
significant metric for success. The clearest consistency is that all of these infrastructures 
are ultimately under the direction and responsibility of the state’s Governor and his/her 
constitutional responsibilities for statewide public health and safety. Therefore, it is 
possible to conclude that a lack of national uniformity in this area is immaterial as long as 
state and national goals and objectives are being met. 
d. Missions 
Contrary to the above mentioned lack of consistency, the missions of these 
state organizational infrastructures are very similar. Whether the prevalence of power and 
authority exists within a person, a single agency, or a multi-party council, the overall 
missions of each state in regards to Homeland Security structures can be easily 
generalized. They are charged to “protect”, “coordinate”, “advise”, “recommend”, 
“develop”, “promote”, “lead”, “enhance”, and “implement”. The object of these mission 
action verbs is for the most part to “prevent”, “prepare for”, “respond to”, “recover 
from”, “investigate” and “secure from” acts of terrorism. No two mission statements are 
alike, (though some come fairly close,) but the intent and raison d’être of all the state’s 
infrastructures are similar. 
C. THE STATE HOMELAND SECURITY TASK FORCE – POTENTIAL 
CHARTER 
By combining federal expectations, state practices and other stakeholder input, the 
model structure, mission, and outcomes of a state HSTF can be designed and potentially 
measured against. A proposed charter or executive directive for an HSTF is one way to 
specify the baseline responsibilities that can be either an initiating device or a scorecard 




The mission is to improve statewide terrorism prevention, preparedness, response 
and recovery readiness by providing a single statewide policy coordination group for all 
homeland security issues, initiatives, and strategies. It also provides program oversight of 
homeland security roles among and between federal, state, local, tribal, private and 
volunteer entities. 
2. Scope 
The Task Force will provide homeland security policy recommendations to the 
Governor and/or his/her appointed homeland security advisor. The Task Force will 
address and consider the full spectrum of homeland security activities to include:  
• The prevention of future attacks. 
• The protection of critical assets and infrastructure. 
• The preparedness of all emergency disciplines, businesses, and the general 
public. 
• Response and recovery capabilities. 
• All legal and legislative issues that enhance the state’s security. 
The Task Force must include input or representation (at the policy level) of all 
levels of government, all prevention and response disciplines, the private sector for 
preparedness, the private sector for critical infrastructure protection, statewide and/or 
regional anti-terrorism workgroups, legal advisors and volunteer agencies. The Task 
Force may appoint, or include, existing sub-committees or workgroups to ensure 
inclusion of these representatives and to accomplish specific tactical or programmatic 
activities. The size of the Task Force must balance the needs of broad-based participation 
and organizational effectiveness. 
3. Objectives 
While these may evolve as the fiscal, executive and tactical environment 
fluctuates, it is necessary to meet certain baseline goals. 
• Prevent terrorist attacks. 
• Develop and implement, (or oversee implementation of,) a comprehensive 
statewide homeland security strategy that will guide and prioritize policy 
actions, resource decisions, and operational guidance for all entities for the 
full spectrum of homeland security activities, from prevention through 
prosecution. 
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• Provide effective collaboration, communications and coordination 
between all entities as well as the general public. 
• Effectively, expediently and efficiently allocate, and advocate for, 
sufficient resources in accordance with the statewide strategy. 
• Provide accountability of the effectiveness of all homeland security 
strategic actions and monitor the effectiveness of all programmatic 
activities. 
• Monitor and coordinate with homeland security efforts of regional, 
national, international and federal entities. 
The various, specific operational duties mentioned throughout national strategies, 
grant guidelines, anecdotal analysis and general conversation may be important, or not. It 
is presumptuous to dictate such tasks as mutual aid agreements, interoperability 
strategies, secure intranets, standardized drivers’ licenses, etc. unless these initiatives had 
been identified as gaps and priorities of individual statewide efforts. These products are 
the potential outcomes and/or outputs of a risk assessment driven strategy that is 
coordinated and recommended by a state collaborative group, not part of the some 
“cookie cutter” default strategy. Additionally, a state HSTF would not be accomplishing 
these tasks within its purview or mission and would only provide the oversight and policy 
recommendations that such activities must be accomplished. Operational and 
programmatic workgroups, committees and focus groups may report organizationally to 
the HSTF, but this is not an absolute as long as their activities are coordinated in the “big 
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III. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY STRUCTURES – 
OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS 
Homeland security strategies – whether developed by individuals, 
governments, or the private sector – are a beginning. But general strategies 
must be turned into specific roadmaps to direct local, State, Federal, and 
private sector actions. Turning vision into reality will require sustained 
commitment of human and financial capital over the long term. It will 
require disciplined and consistent approaches balanced against mid-course 
adjustments when necessitated by real versus perceived shortcomings. 
James S. Gilmore III, Chairman of the 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 
Response Capabilities for Terrorism 
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
(a.k.a. The Gilmore Commission)28 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The President’s appeal for Governors to establish a Homeland Security Task 
Force, or some type of collaborative group, initially appears to be an unfunded mandate 
or simply a pass of federal responsibilities to state and local governments to deal with a 
national security threat. After analysis and further design, however, an institution at the 
state level that can provide coordination, collaboration, and communications to all 
entities across the full spectrum of homeland security challenges will increase strategic 
and operational effectiveness for the nation. The administration and Congress took this 
concept to heart as they ordered both the establishment of the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Homeland Security Council. States are different than the federal 
government, however, and complete realignment of existing state government 
organizations may not be possible, wise, or even constitutionally legal in many states. 
However, there is also much flexibility in state constructs that certainly allows for the 
establishment of an HSTF to accomplish the mission and objectives as defined in this 
thesis. This chapter will use the conclusions from Chapter II’s analysis of federal 
requirements, state official preferences and current state approaches. This chapter will 
suggest outcomes and outputs of a state’s organization for homeland security 
                                                 
28 James S. Gilmore et al. Volume V. Forging America’s New Normalcy. From the Advisory Panel to 
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Report 
prepared and edited by the Rand Corporation. Arlington, VA. December 15, 2003. 1. 
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infrastructure.  Combined with the model mission, scope, and composition of an effective 
state infrastructure, states can adjust and measure their ability to provide program 
oversight of homeland security roles among and between federal, state, local, tribal, 
private and volunteer entities. 
The expectations of federal documents tend to imply outputs, outcomes and 
sometimes even performance measures but not stated as such. An outcome is an 
interaction of an output with the external environment and as the previous chapter’s 
analysis illuminates, a clear definition does not yet exist for the expected outcomes of 
state homeland security organizations.  
B. OBJECTIVES TO OUTCOMES 
What are outcomes? Harry P. Hatry defines them, as “events, occurrences or 
changes in conditions, behavior, or attitudes that indicate progress toward achievement of 
the mission and objectives of the program. Thus outcomes are linked to the program’s 
(and its agency’s) overall mission – its reason for existing, [emphasis added].”29 When 
the establishments of state HSTFs are considered, the first step in their development 
should be the establishment of measurable outcomes for that particular organization. For 
what reasons would, or do, these organizations exist? The General Accounting Office in 
April of 2002 testified to the Senate Committee on Government Affairs that two key 
ingredients were missing from current strategic efforts towards combating terrorism: the 
lack of measurable outcomes and the lack of the identification of appropriate roles for 
state and local governments.30 This testimony occurred prior to the publication of the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security in June 2002 and its impact on the authors of 
the strategy is unknown. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Harry P. Hatry, “What Type of Performance Information Should be Tracked?,” Quicker, Better, 
Cheaper? Managing Performance in American Government, ed. Dall W. Forsythe, New York: Rockefeller 
Institute Press, 2001. 21. 
30 David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States. In testimony to the Committee on Government 
Affairs, U.S. Senate. Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability in Achieving National Goals. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Expected release on April 22, 2002. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02627t.pdf, 7, accessed February 19, 2004. 
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The National Strategy for Homeland Security clearly establishes three objectives: 
• Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
• Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 
• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. 
It further states, “that the order of these objectives deliberately sets priorities for 
America’s efforts to secure the homeland.”31 However, these are not the outcomes.32 
These are the objectives in which direction the nation must act towards based upon the 
achievement of measurable outcomes. Thus, it is possible to state that the outcomes, both 
intermediate and end, are the environmentally influenced events, occurrences or changes 
in conditions, behavior, or attitudes that lead to the final objectives as stated previously. 
Since the objectives stated earlier are intended to be national, not federal, in their 
application, it would be reasonable to assume that these objectives would also be 
considered as priorities of state government efforts as well, and therefore, the state 
HSTFs would also be aiming towards them. What would reasonable and potentially 
measurable outcomes that an HSTF would be responsible for look like?  Without 
immediately addressing the differences between the intermediate and end designations, it 
might be possible to postulate potential outcomes for each of the three national objectives 
for homeland security. 
1. Prevent Terrorist Attacks within the United States 
The large significance of external factors which influence whether a terrorist 
attack occurs or not makes the chore of measuring the effectiveness of any government 
action difficult to accomplish. Did the attack not occur because of all the effort and 
resources dedicated to the building of intelligence sharing systems? Or did the terrorist 
organization decide not to attack because of its own financial challenges? Regardless of 
whether a state HSTF is established for primarily operational or policy activities, if one is 
established that follows the essentials identified in Table 1, it could influence, direct, or 
                                                 
31 Ibid., National Strategy for Homeland Security. 3. 
32 While one could argue that the prevention of future attacks is an outcome or goal for the 
achievement of homeland security rather than an objective, it could also be considered as an objective equal 
to the achievement of other national security objectives along with the prevention of other threats to 
national security such as nation-state conflicts and economic warfare. It begs the question of whether 
homeland security is a supporting element to the achievement of national security or vice versa. Regardless, 
even if the prevention of terrorist attacks is an outcome or goal rather than an objective, it still needs 
intermediate outcomes to be defined in order to eventually establish and focus efforts/outputs.  
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even enact the essential components of prevention. Unfortunately, these are not yet 
established in agreeable doctrine either. One method of looking at the elements of 
prevention is by looking at the flow of outcomes needed for prevention. Figure 1 depicts 
a potential methodology.  
It is possible to rephrase the four major elements depicted below into relatively 
measurable outcomes for a state government level effort: 
• Increased ability to identify indications of an existing or future threat. 
• Increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats as they are identified. 
• Reduced vulnerability of critical infrastructures and other potential targets. 
• Increased appropriateness of protection and/or other threat response 
activities. 
It is reasonable to argue that the 13 Critical Infrastructure Sectors33 designated in 
national strategies and Presidential directives are more appropriately addressed in the 
second national objective, “reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism.” However, in 
this proposed approach, they can be more logically related to prevention and protection 









































&  W arning 
 
Figure 1.                                                   Components of Prevention
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33 Ibid., 30. 
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34 This diagram was drafted during a workshop of subject matters experts at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security on January 28-29, 2004. The principle author is Bruce 
Lawlor, first Chief of Staff for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. I modified it slightly from its 
original draft version. 
2. Reduce America’s Vulnerability to Terrorism 
“Our free society is inherently vulnerable,” states the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security.35 A state might either reword this objective to be state-specific or 
accept the phrase as stated with the recognition of the critical role that states play in 
overall national homeland security efforts. Regardless, the attempt at reducing the 
vulnerabilities is more than just “inherent”; they are incredibly numerous. In an attempt 
to categorize the vulnerabilities, a state HSTF following the basic tenets of Table 1, might 
state them in these terms consistent with the national strategy36:  people, democracy, 
liberties, security, economy, and culture. If accepted as the very high-level vulnerabilities 
the nation is trying to reduce the weaknesses within, then it is feasible to express high-
level outcomes for each: 
• Reduction of the mental and physical vulnerabilities of the general public 
to acts of terrorism. 
• Uninterrupted preservation of the tenets of the U.S. and individual state 
constitutions. 
• Reduced negative impacts to the baseline security of the state and nation 
from both external and internal actors. 
• Increased resistance to the negative influence of terrorism on the natural 
performance of state, national and regional economic processes. 
• Reduced negative influence of terrorism on essential cultural aspects of 
American society. 
These are indeed lofty outcomes in which valuable measurement tools will be 
difficult to develop, but it is not impossible. For example, in the first outcome, 
psychologists and sociologists could develop tools to somehow gauge the “robustness” of 
the American public through case studies, surveys and other analytical tools of their trade 
and track the trends and changes over time. Constitutional scholars could research and 
analyze trends in any changes to the application of constitutional provisions influenced 
by terrorism, and economists could analyze the micro- and macro-performance indicators 
of the economy to see if they are impacted by terrorism or our responses to the threat. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 7. 
36 Ibid. 7 and 8. 
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3. Minimize the Damage and Recover from Attacks That Do Occur 
This objective really contains two separate action statements: minimize and 
recover. These objectives are closer to measurable outcome statements than the two of a 
higher priority, but nevertheless, deserve better outcome descriptions: 
• Limited and minimized damage to people, property, the economy and the 
environment that might occur because of terrorist attacks. 
• Expedient recovery process in the event of a terrorist attack in which all 
basic life activities and infrastructures are returned to a normal, near 
normal, or a better than normal state rapidly. 
In summary, these eleven outcomes begin to put more concrete context into the 
three national priority objectives. Analytical tools can be established for all of these even 
though they are fairly high-level, but not unachievable, outcomes that are appropriate for 
national and state government efforts. The requirements and expectations concluded in 
Chapter II seemed at first blush to contain many outcomes we might expect from a state 
HSTF, but they more accurately run the gamut of all the things possibly desired  to 
happen at the administrative, tactical, operational and strategic levels. These eleven 
outcomes will help to begin to create a better taxonomy into which the expectations 
might appropriately fit. The next step in this discussion is to develop outputs and/or 
intermediate outcomes that would help a state focus its efforts and resources to achieve 
these potential end outcomes and from there, positively influence the achievement of the 
strategic objectives. 
C. SELECT OUTCOMES TO OUTPUTS – PREVENTION OF ATTACKS 
How can you measure how many shipwrecks a lighthouse prevents? 




Mr. Hatry proffers that one person may view a particular action as an output while 
another may consider it a type of outcome.37 In accepting this idea, 1) the role of states is 
critical in advancing the national homeland security objectives, 2) that Section B has 
outlined potential outcomes for the achievement of these objectives, and 3) that state  
                                                 
37 Ibid., Harry P. Hatry. 17. 
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homeland security organizations will be looked upon to focus statewide efforts towards 
these outcomes. Then outputs, (products or services delivered,) can be proposed which 
will interact with the environment to hopefully advance the attainment of the outcomes. 
The number one priority of national and state efforts must be to prevent terrorist 
attacks from occurring in the first place. Achievement of this objective, for the most part, 
makes all other activities moot.38 For the scope of this paper, this section will describe 
potential outputs for the achievement of the outcomes just related to the objective of the 
prevention of terrorist attacks upon a state. The outcomes for prevention described in 
Sub-section B.1 will be utilized to organize the proposed outputs. 
In June 2003, the Office for Domestic Preparedness published guidelines for state 
and local governments for the prevention of terrorist attacks.39 It lists and categorizes 
over 130 individual activities or tasks, most of which could be considered outputs 
although they run the gamut from administrative to strategic efforts. Chapter II’s analysis 
of federal requirements, state official preferences and current state approaches also 
provide some outputs that might be useful in achieving the outcomes of prevention. 
Clearly the list of outputs for the prevention of terrorism could draw from thousands of 
potential courses of action. In the context of this thesis, it is important to relate outputs 
specifically related to the possible vision of a state HSTF. 
1. Outcome 1: Increased Ability to Identify Indications of an Existing 
or Future Threat 
• Development of a strategy and commensurate business plans that describe 
how to assure the collaboration amongst all entities that participate in 
threat identification processes. 
• Creation and implementation of a system to collect, screen and store 
relevant information with investigative value.40 
• Development of a training system that provides adequate basic level threat 
awareness education to all public service entities, the private sector, and 
the general public as appropriate. 
                                                 
38 It is acknowledged that increased ability to minimize, damage and respond and recover from 
terrorist attacks can also be thought to implicitly increase prevention. 
39 Office for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Prevention Guidelines 
for Homeland Security. The Office of Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security June 
2003: Prevention and Deterrence. Washington D.C. June 2003. 
40 Ibid., 19. 
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2. Outcome 2: Increased Ability to Evaluate the Potential of Threats 
As They Are Identified 
• Adopt or develop an appropriate analytical model to assess threat 
indications. 
• Ensure collaboration and integration of assessment and evaluation 
processes from traditional as well as non-traditional investigative entities, 
(e.g. health and agricultural agencies.) 
• Create and/or assign a lead organization to oversee and coordinate a 
system of threat identification and assessment processes. 
• Through policy, legislative and/or executive action, identify and develop 
strategies to overcome barriers to the appropriate sharing of information 
and intelligence products. 
3. Outcome 3: Reduced Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructures and 
Other Potential Targets 
• Assign or create a lead entity to oversee the effort to identify, assess 
vulnerabilities of, analyze consequences, and recommend protective 
strategies and priorities of critical infrastructures and potential targets of 
terrorists. 
• Develop and oversee strategies and action plans that maximize the 
collaboration and coordination of the owners of potential targets and the 
state effort to reduce their vulnerabilities. 
• Provide a leadership point to assure the coordination between private, 
local, state, and federal critical infrastructure protection efforts. 
4. Outcome 4: Increased Appropriateness of Protection and/or Other 
Threat Response Activities 
• Establish and oversee a process that ensures the interconnection of the first 
three outcomes that will result in recommendations for protection 
decisions and threat response measures. 
• Develop a risk management or cost benefit tool that will guide appropriate 
protection and response action decisions. 
• Develop a model that delineates responsibilities for varying degrees of 
decision-making amongst and between levels of government and the 
private sector. 
These outputs should be the responsibility of a state HSTF.  This organization, 
with the proper delegation or access to authority, can easily track and focus upon these 
outputs and develop the resources and define the inputs needed for their accomplishment.  
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Following this process will lead ultimately to the accomplishment of the outcomes and 
thereby a strong effort towards the accomplishment of the priority objective, preventing 
terrorist attacks. 
The establishment of effective performance measures representative of the 
outputs and outcomes for these state homeland security organizations is critical. 
However, the establishment of measurements first requires an investigation of the 
expectations of the task forces, an analysis of the expected outcomes of the task forces 
and the commiserate outputs required to positively influence the desired outcomes to 
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IV. CASE STUDY:  STATE OF WASHINGTON HOMELAND 
SECURITY - ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
How would the author’s state stack up against the model charter and themes, 
characteristics, outcomes and outputs as described in this thesis? The state of Washington 
possesses a significant share of the national risk and must address all the activities any 
state would in terms of the protection of its citizens, its critical infrastructures, and 
national assets. An evaluation within the confines of the HSTF topic would not 
necessarily determine the state’s overall efforts and success in addressing homeland 
security, but it could illuminate whether or not Washington State is answering the 
National Strategy’s plea for a single structure. 
B. CURRENT HOMELAND SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Washington State has several components in its homeland security infrastructure. 
The four primary groups are the Committee on Homeland Security, the Emergency 
Management Council, the Governor’s Domestic Security Executive Group, and the 
Department of Health’s two primary advisory groups: 
The Committee on Homeland Security is a Governor directed organization which 
was formed in November 1999 to provide recommendations for the prevention of, 
preparation for, response to, and recovery from criminal acts of terrorism. The 
composition is multi-jurisdictional and multi-discipline and with the inclusion of its sub-
committees, has over 170 members. This group meets monthly, sub-committees more 
often, and its primary focus has been to address programmatic and operational issues to 
include administrative recommendations for the distribution of federal grants. The state’s 
Emergency Management Council first sees the Committee’s recommendations for 
concurrence before going to the appropriate final authority for execution. 
The Emergency Management Council is a 17 member statutorily established body 
tasked with assessing statewide emergency preparedness and providing recommendations 
to the Governor and the Director of Emergency Management, the state’s Adjutant 
General by statute, on all aspects of emergency preparedness. It has three standing sub- 
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committees: the Committee on Homeland Security, the Seismic Safety Committee, and 
the State Emergency Response Commission required by federal law to address and 
coordinate hazardous material response issues. 
The Domestic Security Executive Group was established in the days following the 
September 11th attacks. This small “terrorism cabinet” meets weekly to coordinate state 
agency activities, policy and initiatives on behalf of the Governor. It is chaired by the 
Governor’s Homeland Security Point of Contact, the Adjutant General, and consists of 
the state directors/secretaries of emergency management, health, agriculture, state patrol, 
ecology, information services, transportation, and a representative of the Attorney 
General’s Office. It also includes the Governor’s Chief of Staff, Director of the Office of 
Financial Management, Communications Director, and other senior policy and budget 
staff. 
The Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Advisory Committee 
and the Hospital Emergency Preparedness and Response Advisory Committee were 
established under the auspices of the health and hospital supplemental fiscal awards in 
2002. They include multiple representatives from all aspects of the health and medical 
community as well as the emergency response communities. They report to the state’s 
Secretary of Health. 
Federal entities such as the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council and the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force are valuable components of the state’s overall infrastructure, but 
only loosely tied to state specific efforts through either the state patrol or the Adjutant 
General himself. 
Numerous other workgroups or existing commissions, councils and committees 
exist that have a stake in homeland security programs and policies but are generally 
driven by larger missions. These organizations are generally affiliated with a state agency 
or a larger commission or workgroup. All of these interacting agencies, groups, and 
councils can be depicted in a hierarchical manner with lines of command, control and/or 
coordination. However, recent presentations by Washington State officials have strived to 
portray that the state’s Homeland Security infrastructure performs in more of a system of 
systems approach in which these groups intersect and collaborate when necessary. The 
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combination of these systems’ interactions follow directions from the Governor as well as 
provide him advice on the one hand, while at the same time provide influence and input 
to national and federal entities such as the National Governor’s Association, the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the White House and 
others. 
C. WASHINGTON STATE’S INFRASTRUCTURE IN REGARDS TO THE 
MODEL CHARTER 
Discussions in Washington State periodically occur concerning the establishment 
of an HSTF in Washington State and involve options ranging from the creation of a new 
organization to the assignment of activities to an existing one. However, does the state 
already meet the desired characteristics of an HSTF? This section will compare the 
state’s current characteristic against the model charter proposed in Chapter II. 
1. Mission 
The mission is to improve statewide terrorism prevention, preparedness, response 
and recovery readiness by providing a single statewide policy coordination group for all 
homeland security issues, initiatives, and strategies. It also is to provide program 
oversight of homeland security roles among and between federal, state, local, tribal, 
private and volunteer entities. 
While the state is accomplishing many activities that improve statewide terrorism 
prevention, preparedness and response readiness, the many efforts from all levels of 
government and the private sector can claim only one real single point of contact for the 
state and that is the Adjutant General in his position as the Homeland Security Point of 
Contact (HS POC.) Even then, this individual is not able to collaborate and coordinate 
with every entity routinely.  He relies upon the eventual filter of information and 
recommendations to him through an existing agency or homeland security group. Often, 
especially for private sector activities and needs, only the issues and initiatives that have 
come to a critical juncture or point of failure make it to top levels of discussion. No 
existing group in the Washington infrastructure can claim to be the “one” point of contact 
for all issues. Additionally, program oversight is often split among a few state agencies 




The Task Force will provide homeland security policy recommendations to the 
Governor and/or his/her appointed homeland security advisor. The Task Force will 
address and consider the full spectrum of homeland security activities to include:  
• The prevention of future attacks. 
• The protection of critical assets and infrastructure. 
• The preparedness of all emergency disciplines, businesses, and the general 
public. 
• Response and recovery capabilities. 
• All legal and legislative issues that enhance the state’s security. 
The Task Force must include input or representation from the policy level of all 
levels of government, all prevention and response disciplines, the private sector for 
preparedness, the private sector for critical infrastructure protection, statewide and/or 
regional anti-terrorism workgroups, legal advisors and volunteer agencies. The Task 
Force may appoint, or include, existing sub-committees or workgroups to ensure 
inclusion of these representatives and to accomplish specific tactical or programmatic 
activities. The size of the Task Force must balance the needs of broad-based participation 
and organizational effectiveness. 
a. Scope, Part 1 
Recommendations are routed to the Governor and his HS POC as needed 
but the entire spectrum of homeland security issues from prevention to prosecution is not 
comprehensively addressed by any single entity. No single body oversees the five 
elements within the scope of an HSTF, with the possible exception of the Domestic 
Security Executive Group. This group, however, only addresses urgent and near term 
policy issues and challenges, and seldom engages in long term strategic problem solving 
and goal setting. The tasking of these functions more often rests with individual agencies 
and/or other committees on an individual element level. 
b. Scope, Part 2 
There is no doubt that through one of the four primary organizations of the 
infrastructure or through one of the legs of the network, that just about every stakeholder 
is somehow involved. However, not a single organization exists that includes all the 
policy level representatives from all the desired entities. For example, while the mayors 
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and county commissioners are represented on the Emergency Management Council, the 
state Attorney General and Secretary of Transportation are not. While a sub-committee of 
the Committee on Terrorism has significant private sector involvement at the tactical 
level, there is no location for the collaboration of public-private policy for the protection 
of critical infrastructure. 
c. Objectives 
While these may evolve as the fiscal, executive and tactical environment 
fluctuates, it is necessary to meet certain baseline goals. 
• Prevent terrorist attacks. 
• Develop and implement, or oversee implementation of, a comprehensive 
statewide homeland security strategy that will guide and prioritize policy 
actions, resource decisions, and operational guidance for all entities for the 
full spectrum of homeland security activities, from prevention through 
prosecution. 
• Provide effective collaboration, communications and coordination 
between all entities as well as the general public. 
• Effectively, expediently and efficiently allocate, and advocate for, 
sufficient resources in accordance with the statewide strategy. 
• Provide accountability of the effectiveness of all homeland security 
strategic actions and monitor the effectiveness of all programmatic 
activities. 
• Monitor and coordinate with homeland security efforts of regional, 
national, international and federal entities. 
3. Objectives 
Effective administration and accountability for the programmatic outcomes of 
several grants and initiatives is being achieved and the recently published statewide 
strategic plan will help set measurements. The Federal metric of the effectiveness of 
“moving money out the door” is being achieved but it is done within a realm of 
operational success, not necessarily strategic success. Some of this challenge should fall 
upon the congressional and federal agency shoulders as their grants only ask for and 
focus upon programmatic progress. Washington State’s multi-level approach to 
developing resource and funding recommendations and the consequent decision-making 
are very effective. There is hardly an interest or stakeholder that does not have an 
opportunity to voice their opinion or become part of the objective risk/need based 
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process. Federal efforts are monitored well within the infrastructure of Washington State 
and local efforts are also well reported and tracked. “Partnership” does not seem to be an 
issue, but to what strategic end must it be established?  
D. WASHINGTON STATE’S INFRASTRUCTURE IN REGARDS TO 
OUTCOMES AND OUTPUTS 
Washington State has just completed and published the Washington Statewide 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan which “provides the frameworks through which we 
will strengthen our ability to defend against, deter, dissuade, and ultimately respond to 
and recover from terrorist acts in the State of Washington.”41 The plan delineates the 
strategic objectives, priorities, goals, objectives and implementation strategies for the 
state’s efforts to address terrorism and homeland security. By comparing Chapter III’s 
recommended objectives, outcomes and outputs against the state’s intended efforts, it is 
possible to evaluate the state’s direction.  
1. Strategic Objectives 
The state’s strategic objectives clearly reflect the intent of the national objectives 
but also narrow them for the state’s approach: 
• Reduce Washington’s vulnerability to terrorism. Defend against, deter, 
dissuade and prevent terrorist attacks from occurring within Washington 
State. 
• Prepare citizens, government, tribal nations and businesses at all levels to 
effectively respond in the event of a terrorist attack. 
• Minimize the damage and effectively respond to and recover from attacks 
that do occur. 
2. Outcomes 
Chapter III establishes eleven separate outcomes that are divided among the three 
national objectives. It is important to remember that these are outcomes for the state’s 
Homeland Security infrastructure not necessarily its overall statewide efforts.  
 
 
                                                 
41 Major General Timothy J. Lowenberg, The Adjutant General, Director, Washington Military 
Department. Washington Homeland Security Advisor Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic 
Plan. January 2004. Preface page. 
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Washington State has begun efforts that appear to address the outcomes for the 
prevention of future attacks. The state’s strategic plan clearly outlines goals and 
objectives that speak to each of the four outcomes for this objective.42 Since all these 
outcomes cannot be accomplished solely by any one agency or entity, the necessity of a 
collaborative and coordinated, multi-player infrastructure is essential. The state is well 
suited for the achievement of these outcomes as long as the state’s system of systems 
integration approach do not diffuse or degrade the implementation strategies and task 
assignments. 
The achievement of the outcomes for the vulnerability reduction objective is also 
dependent on multiple players. However, in this case, those players need to come from 
legal, sociological, economic, psychological and other fields that are not predominant 
players in the current state construct. While some of the players come from the state’s 
Attorney General’s Office, the business community and federal border agencies, the 
overall construct for achieving the proposed outcomes for this objective is inadequate. 
In contrast to the aforementioned assessment, the state’s infrastructure approach is 
well suited to accomplish the two outcomes for minimizing damage and recovering from 
effects of terrorist attacks. This may be because the outcomes are not new to the 
traditional state and federal approaches to comprehensive emergency management in 
which coordination, collaboration, which has always been a multi-agency, multi-
jurisdictional approach and has existed in doctrine, plans, and practice for decades. These 
elements practically require the non-hierarchical systems approach of Washington State 
to be most effective. 
3. Outputs for Prevention 
Chapter III proposes 13 outputs for the four outcomes for a state Homeland 
Security infrastructure to produce in order to advance the prevention objective. In order 
to be realized, these outputs also require multiple players interacting effectively but they 
also demand, and in some cases explicitly state, that someone or some agency has to be 
put in charge. Some of these outputs are very similar to the objectives as stated in the 
state’s strategic plan and the state has begun to assign responsibility as well as track 
                                                 
42 Washington Military Department. Washington Homeland Security Advisor Washington Statewide 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan. January 2004. 25-26. 
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progress through the use of a balanced scorecard approach. The state’s current Homeland 
Security structure enables the production of these outputs as long as it specifically 
identifies the outputs, assigns specific responsibility, provides resources, and tracks and 
measures progress. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The construct of Washington State’s infrastructure for Homeland Security has 
been most successful in its inclusiveness of many players, agencies and points of 
coordination. The recent development and publication of the state’s statewide strategic 
plan will focus future efforts and activities and ideally guide, if not dictate, future 
expenditure decisions. The future requirements that Washington State has set upon itself 
to develop specific business and work plans for each of its objectives and implementation 
strategies clearly demonstrates the state’s commitment to a conscious and monitored 
realization of the tenets of their strategic plan. 
However, the trade-offs between a clear, operational command and control type 
structure for a more diffuse collaborative “system of systems” construct illustrates areas 
that can be improved. However, adjustments can be taken to address the concerns of the 
former without sacrificing the benefits of the latter. Based upon the results of the case 
study as well as the previous analyses in Chapters II through IV, it is possible to propose 
specific recommendations for the State of Washington. 
1. “Overtly” Assign a Lead State Agency 
While the Adjutant General is clearly the identified and recognized Homeland 
Security leader for the state, that distinction does not necessarily translate to his overall 
department and his Emergency Management Division (EMD.) It is mostly assumed that 
his immediate assistants and EMD are the central point of coordination and 
administration for Homeland Security, but the emphasis on the collaborative structure 
detracts from what may exist as the “one stop shop” for all Homeland Security activities 
in the state. The Military Department, or its EMD, should be clearly designated as the 
Lead State Agency and resourced to accomplish any additional efforts that would come 
from this assignment. The renaming of the department or EMD to include the Homeland 
Security nomenclature should also be considered as a possibility. 
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2. Seek a Specific Legislative Mandate and Appropriation 
The benefits of establishing the infrastructure, leadership and strategic charter of 
the state Homeland Security in law or rule outweigh the loss of flexibility that a 
gubernatorial assignment offers. The “war on terrorism” is expected to last for many 
more years, if not decades, and state efforts need a firmer sense of permanency and 
consistency. Additionally, the specific efforts of the leading agencies and designated 
leader should not be constrained by federal funding uncertainty and the limitations of 
federal grant “allowable” activities. Appropriation of state funds should be enacted or 
else the ebbs and flows of Homeland Security efforts will be dictated by federal 
government resource ambiguity and not by the public safety needs of the state. It is also 
imperative to consider specific additional powers and authorities to the state’s Homeland 
Security leader to strengthen and clarify operational and administrative lines amongst 
organizations, levels of government and the private sector. 
3. Continue “System of Systems” Approach, but Strengthen Direction 
and Control Delineations 
The infrastructure that existed before the events of 2001 worked effectively for 
the scope of activities and requirements that the state addressed. However, the advent of 
the enormous grants, new interactions, new relationships and vocal politics following the 
attacks demand that a piece of the state’s infrastructure clearly establish and identify the 
direction, control and coordination relationships between agencies, councils, committees 
and boards. The current system is strong, but much of this strength is due to the positive 
associations and leadership skills of existing players. As these players change over time, 
especially upon the upcoming gubernatorial transition, new individuals will be introduced 
who will be expected to interact effectively but who will not have the benefit of historical 
relationships. A clearly defined operating environment, with strengthened direction and 
control components, is important to strengthen the current approach and is essential to the 
continuing success of the state’s efforts. 
4. Enhance the Focus of the Infrastructure 
Different pieces of the state’s Homeland Security infrastructure will oversee 
different elements of the statewide strategic plan. However, the overall infrastructure, in 
of itself, should also establish outcomes and outputs for success. Chapter III identified 
some recommendations for a state HSTF that could be considered, but the largest gap in 
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the State of Washington’s approach is the focused consideration of the outcomes for the 
“reducing vulnerability” objective. This element should be emphasized for 
accomplishment by the state. It might be prudent to ask partners not currently engaged in 
this effort to participate and an organizational change may be necessary for its success.  
5. Redirect or Enhance DSEG towards More Strategic Engagement 
The Governor’s key contact group for Homeland Security advice is his group of 
select cabinet members and key staff. This group possesses extraordinary experience, 
knowledge, skills and abilities that individually and collectively execute his direction 
very effectively. However, they have traditionally dealt with relatively short term policy 
issues and executive oversight of administrative issues. If a strategic, “over the horizon” 
focus were consciously engaged by this collective group, the added benefit to the overall 
safety and security of the state of Washington and its interests would be considerable.  
Washington State has a very effective approach to addressing homeland security 
issues and protecting its citizens. However, there is always room for improvement and 
the key players in statewide Homeland Security have consistently demonstrated a desire 
for ever increasing levels of service delivery and effectiveness.  Where feasible, the 
collaboration-emphasized approach should be enhanced with effective integration efforts 
that more clearly identify direction, control and coordination relationships. All the pieces, 
players and leaders for effective Homeland Security already exist and they are ready for 
the next level of sophistication. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
As the nation continues to pursue the security of the homeland, it is clear that state 
and local governments must participate and organize for this endeavor. It is more 
important to prevent terrorist attacks through engagements oversees, but this preference 
should not detract from the importance and critical nature of preventing attacks here at 
home. Additionally, the misconception that prevention is solely a law enforcement 
activity primarily conducted by the federal government must also be corrected as state 
and local governments need to play a critical role in threat identification, threat 
evaluation, target assessment and the consequent protection and threat response measures 
necessary to deter, deny and defend against attacks. Significant portions of this 
prevention process are conducted by non-law enforcement entities such as the symptom 
surveillance activities conducted by hospital and health agencies, the monitoring and 
testing of food supplies by agricultural agencies, and the identification, assessment and 
prioritization of critical infrastructures compiled by a number of agencies as well as the 
private sector. This process will be wholly ineffective without a deliberative and 
organized management structure at the state government level. Add the complexity of 
integrating other components of state government responsibilities in the response and 
recovery phases, and it is clear that the creation of clearly identified organizational 
infrastructures, or Homeland Security Task Forces, is essential to local, statewide, 
regional and national success in the battle for our national security. 
This thesis did not argue against the federal call for the creation of HSTFs or 
some otherwise named infrastructure, but it did suggest recommendations to fill a 
vacuum of uncertainty and unclear guidance in the construct, focus, and measurement 
standards of these important state structures. Based upon expectations, both implied and 
explicit, a model charter for a state Homeland Security infrastructure is recommended. 
This charter includes a scope of activities and focus areas as well as suggested objectives 
for the HSTF that support a clear mission statement: to improve statewide terrorism 
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery readiness by providing a single 
statewide policy coordination group for all homeland security issues, initiatives, and 
strategies, and to provide program oversight of homeland security roles among and 
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between federal, state, local, tribal, private and volunteer entities. During the analysis of 
existing state structures in Chapter II, it was clear that the missions of existing 
approaches at the state level were not significantly different from this recommended 
mission. However, the approaches, legal authorities, composition, and measurement 
techniques were clearly diverse across the nation and ranged in a manner that even 
exceeds the flexibility and self-determination that individual Governor’s deserve as they 
organize for Homeland Security. “State’s rights” are important but not to the point of 
damaging the collective national interests because of a lack of some commonality among 
state approaches. The similarity of state approaches should not be in a “cookie cutter” 
fashion where all states are identical in size, composition, and nomenclature, but the 
strategic goals, objectives and outcomes that each state is striving for should be consistent 
in order to effectively build a national, coordinated effort.    
How Homeland Security efforts should be resourced and the commensurate levels 
of effort prioritized are a continuing, and often contentious, debate occurring at all levels 
of government and among all individual disciplines. Nonetheless, the application of 
resources is rarely decided through a deliberate approach that focuses upon the critical 
requirements to meet well defined outcomes and outputs. Billions of dollars continue to 
be distributed to federal, state and local governments based primarily upon political 
considerations as opposed to providing these means to meet the ends of a secure 
homeland. This thesis identifies outcomes that states should be focusing upon to advance 
the national priority objectives of preventing future attacks, reducing America’s 
vulnerabilities and effectively minimizing damage and recovering from attacks that do 
occur. However, by themselves, outcomes do not provide complete guidance in strategic 
planning and budgeting for statewide Homeland Security. The effective application of 
resources is more controllable then the interaction of these applications with the external 
environment. Achieving the desired outcomes requires well defined and agreed upon 
outputs that when efficiently enacted, will drive individual and collective agency efforts 
closer to the achievement of desired goals. The prevention of terrorist attacks is pre-
eminent in the process to achieving true Homeland Security. Therefore, the identification 
of state level outputs to meet the four outcomes for prevention is proposed in this work.  
Still, all these outputs and outcomes for prevention must be managed, directed, and 
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synthesized by a strong state infrastructure that has the ability to tie the myriad of 
individual actions together into a clear, systematic, collaborative and coordinated 
approach. Without this, the nation is subject to repeat the failures and re-exposes 
vulnerabilities to the fragmented and stove-piped efforts that resulted in two decades of 
sporadic, yet successful, terrorist attacks against U.S. interests at home and abroad. 
Finally, the analysis of the State of Washington’s approach to organizing for 
Homeland Security produced additional important lessons for all states. Washington State 
has an effective collaborative, coordinated and conscious organizational approach and 
one that is enhanced by exceptional leadership. The recent publication of the Washington 
Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan and the strict adherence to its application 
will continue to improve the state’s security as well as set an example for other strategic 
planning and application efforts. Nonetheless, the state should still consider additional 
policy level efforts that would create an even stronger and longer lasting organizational 
approach to state-level Homeland Security. Clearly identifying a lead state agency, 
seeking state legislative mandate and investment, strengthening command and control 
lines, and enhancing the focus of individual and collective sub-entities of the state’s 
structure would accelerate the state’s success for security by orders of magnitude. These 
recommendations would also ensure the continuation of comprehensive efforts through 
an infrastructure that would not be subject to inevitable changes in individual leadership 
positions and/or their dedication to this critical national effort. 
This paper provides a roadmap to success for individual state approaches to 
organizing for Homeland Security. The recommendations are based upon an analysis of 
directives, their implications, national strategies, existing approaches and a case study of 
a successful state’s efforts. The call for organizing for the war on terror is acknowledged, 
accepted, and for the most part, vigorously answered. But how the nation’s states 
organize and to what ends their resources are applied will determine national and even 
international victory in this war. This is significantly more important than the simple 
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